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Non-Immigrant Labor Policy in the United States 
Vernon M .  Briggs, Jr.  
The employment of foreign workers as a supplement to the domestic 
labor force has been a recurrent public policy issue throughout much of 
the history of the United States. Under specific circumstances, non- 
immigrant workers have been allowed legal access to the American labor 
market. They should not be confused with illegal immigrants who do not 
have such a privilege. The legislative and administrative actions that have 
authorized non-immigrant programs traditionally have been shrouded in 
controversy. Policy concerns have centered upon both the economic 
effects of non-immigrant workers on working conditions for citizen work- 
ers and the special restrictions often imposed on no~n-immigrants that 
would be considered unfair and often illegal if applied to citizen workers. 
Included among the various reforms of the nation's immigration system 
for the 1980s have been a host of proposals to alter the role of non- 
immigrant policy. It has been suggested that the policy can serve as a 
means to overcome specific labor shortages and to reduce the general 
problem of illegal immigration. T o  understand its potential to accom- 
plish these goals, it is necessary to place non-immigrant policy in an evo- 
lutionary context. For if we examine isolated events at  different points 
in history, the policy seems to be merely ad hoc reactions to those events 
of a particular time. A long-term perspective, however, reveals develop- 
mental patterns. Recognition of these themes and characteristics is essen- 
tial to any effort to evaluate the efficacy of contemporary non-immigrant 
policy as well as the pending proposals that call for an expansion of such 
endeavors. 
The author is Professor o f  Labor Economics, Corneil University. 
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T h e  initial effort to cqtnhlish hy law the right of American employers 
tv recruit ;rnd hirc fvreign I:ih~>r to  \v~>rk in the Unitcd States was the Con- 
tr;lct L;lhar Act of I S h l .  Enoctctl as ;I wartinic measure, i t  was repealed 
in 1868 although pri\ ' i~te groups continued the practice with little inter- 
ruption for many yr.;lrs ;~ftcr\v:rrJ. During most of this period, the nation 
had cssentinlly all <>pen ininiigr.lti~rn policy to anyone except the Chinese. 
Thus,  technically speaking, the contract lahor era docs not represent a 
non-immigrant prtrgrani. Thosc persona who  were recruited were en- 
couraged to stay as permanent immigrants. Although thc Alien Contract 
Law fin:llly banncd contract labor in 1885. its principles laid the con- 
ccptu;ll foundation for subsequent non-immigrant programs. 
Only months aftcr the Llnited State:, ennstcd the most restrictive immi- 
gration legislation in its hihtory u p  until that time-the Im~nigrat ion Act 
of 191 7-it initiated the fil-st puhlisly sanctioned foreign Iahor program.' 
In response to strong pressure from the large agricultural growers of the 
Southwest. Congress includeil in the act a provision that wcmld allow en- 
try of "temporary wc>rl~,rs" from Westcrn Hemisphere nations who  were 
"otherwise inadniissihic." I n  hlny 191 7,  with the nation at  war, Congress 
;iuthorized such a temporary inrni worker program with Mexico. Under  
its terms were n ~ l s  designed to protect both citizen workers and Mexican 
workers as  well a s  to assure that tlic tvfcxicans returned home after com- 
pleting their work. But, a:, has  heconic the historic pattern with these 
types of programs. "torus elahorate rules were unenforced."' 
The  Ilnited States ennctc~l  this temporary worker program during 
World V/nr I as being in the national interest. It was suhsequently ex- 
tended until 1912. It ended when its ratinnale as  a national defense policy 
could n o  longer be rnaintainccl. .Also, organized lahor contended that the 
prograni undermined !he cc~rnoniic welfare of citizen workers. Other  
critics believed that there wcre no  lahor shortages hut only opportunistic 
sniployers who wished to  tnp a secure source of cheap and docile workers 
for their own private galn. During the lifespan of the program, 76,862 
hlcxican worl,ers were admitted to  ths  United States, of wliom less than 
half returned to  hlesir~o:' 
The A l ~ . r i r o ~ ~  Lobnr Pri~grntti 
With the coming of World War 11. the military manpower requirements 
of the United St:ites and its rel:~ted mnnufacturing lahor needs led t o  
3ssertions that another labor shortxge existed in the agricultural sector. 
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The growers of thc Southwcst had forcsccn thcse developments and in 
1941 thcy unsuccessfully requested anothcr contract labor program by 
the fcdcral govcrnmcnt. By mid-1 942,  howcvcr, the govcrnment had come 
to favor thc program, but thc govcrnmcnt of Mexico balked at  the pros- 
pect of a formal intcr-governmental agrecmcnt. The  unrcgulatcd hiring 
of Mexican citizens by foreign nations is prohibited by the Mexican Con- 
stitution of 19 1 7.4 
Negotiations bctwccn thc two governments ultimately re:;ultcd in a 
formal agrccmcnt in August 1942 that launched the Mexican 1-abor Pro- 
gram-more popularly known as the "braccro program."" Undcr its 
terms, Mcxican workers werc allowed to  work in agricultural jobs in the 
Unitcd Statcs and thcy wcre to  be afforded numerous protections with 
rcspcct to housing, transportation, food, mcdical nceds, and wages. In- 
cluded within an omnibus appropriations act known a s  P.L. 45, the pro- 
gram was cxtendcd by subsequent enactments until December 3 1, 1947. 
It continucd informally and without regulation until 1951. In that year, 
under the guise of anothcr war-related labor shortage, the bracero pro- 
gram was revivcd by P.L. 78. 
Undcr P.L. 78, Mexican workers could be contractcd for work in thc 
United States. Employers werc rcquired to  pay the prevailing agricultural 
wagc, to provide free housing, to  provide adequate mcals a t  a reasonable 
chargc, and t o  pay all transportation costs from the work site to  thc gov- 
ernment reception centers near the bordcr. Employcrs scldom mct thcse 
requirements." Braccros were exempt from both social security and in- 
come taxcs, which meant that thcy receivcd morc income than would a 
citizen workcr employed at  the identical money wage ratc. T h c  scalc of 
the program can be seen in Table 1. 
In Mcxico, thc national government determined the actual allocation 
process by which the number of workers were to be chosen from among 
several of its states. Thc  state governments, in turn, madc similar decisions 
for their cities and other political subdivisions. T h c  Mcxican govcrnment 
sought to  distribute the job opportunities geographically rather than t o  
simply selcct workers from the available labor pools in the bordcr towns. 
Otherwise, it feared therc might be a mass internal migration to  the 
border region. There were far morc applicants in evcry recruiting center 
than there were available slots. Favoritism and bribery in the selection 
process became widespread. 
The bracero program demonstrated prccisely how border labor policies 
can adverscly affcct citizen workers in the United States-especially, in 
this case, the Chicanos who composcd the bulk of the southwcstern agri- 
cultural labnr force. Agricultural employment in the Southwcst was re- 
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Table 1. F o r e i p ~ ~  l l ' o r k ~ r s  : i d , ~ ~ i l t ~ r l  for T e r ~ l p o I ' n , y  E m p l o y n ~ e n t  in U.S. 
.-lgrir~rItrrrr h v  I'rnr n11(1 X n t i o , l n l i f ~  1942.1979" 
5rifi.iI1 itsc-s1 Jnpar~ese 
I>!dic-.i (i11c111d- and 
I ' P ~ P  T.ltnl 
- 
i c  i,sq Eohn~nns)  Cnr~ndinn Filipino Spni~l  
- 
1942 4,203 4.203 - - - 
1943 65.624 5 2 . 0 9 ~  13,526 - - - 
1944 83.206 62.170 19.622 1,414 - - 
I945 72.900 49A54 19.391 4,055 - - 
1946 51.347 32.043 13.771 5.533 - - 
1947 30.775 19.632 3.722 7.421 - - 
194R 44.916 35.345 3,671 5.900 - - 
1949 112.765 307.000 2.761 3.000 - - 
1950 76.525 67.500 6,225 2.800 - - 
1951 203.640 192.000 9.040 2.600 - - 
1952 210.210 197.100 7.910 5.200 - - 
1953 215.321 201,380 7,741 6.200 - - 
9 5 4  320.737 309.033 4.704 7,000 - - 
1955 41 1.966 398.650 6.616 6.700 - - 
1956 459.850 445,197 7.563 6.700 390 - 
1957 -152.205 436.049 8,171 7.300 685 - 
I958 447,513 432,857 7.44 1 6,900 315 - 
1959 455.420 437>643 8.772 8.600 405 - 
1960 334.729 315,846 9.820 8.200 863 - 
1961 310,375 291,420 10,315 8.600 40 - 
1962 217.010 194.978 12.928 8.700 404 - 
1963 209.218 186.865 12.930 8.500 923 - 
1964 200.022 177.736 14,361 7.900 25 - 
1965 35.871 10.2R4 10.917 4,670 0 - 
1966 24.0E0 8.647 11.194 3.683 0 477 
1967 23.959 6,125 13,578 3.900 0 356 
1968 13,704 0 10.723 2.600 0 381 
1969 16,221 0 13,530 2,300 0 391 
1970 17.937 0 15.470 2,004 0 463 
1971 14.235 0 12,143 1.541 0 551 
1972 12,847 0 11,419 1.107 0 321 
1973 13,551 0 11.712 1.45R 0 381 
1974 14,197 0 1 1,625 1.250 0 322 
1975 12.426 0 11.245 970 0 211 
1976 11.325 0 11,568 572 0 185 
1977 !2,266 0 11.661 399 0 206 
1978 11,581 0 10,955 312 0 274 
1979 12,791 0 12.246 287 0 258 
-- 
.'Due to cnrryover of u.orker from fine year to nnother, the number of workers ad- 
mitted each year is genernlly lo\ver than the actual number of persons employed 
clnring peak harvest sensons. 
SOURCES: Dnla for tho yrnrs 1942 through 1972 are from United States Senate. 
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Committee on the Judiciary. "The West Indies (BWI)  Temporary Alien 
Worker Program 1943-1977" (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office. 1973), Table 2, p. 27; data from 1973 through 1979 are from the 
L.S. Department of Justice, Starisfical Yearbook o f  the Immigratior~ and 
Naruralizarion Service, 1979, Table 18. 
moved from competition with the non-agricultural sector. At the program's 
peak, almost half a million braceros were working annually in the agri- 
cultural labor market of the Southwest. The  availability of Mexican 
workers significantly depressed existing wage levels in some regions, 
modulated wage increases that would have occurred in their absence, and 
sharply compressed the duration of the employment period during which 
many citizen farm workers could find jobs.7 The  thorough report on  the 
bracero program by the President's Commission on Migratory Labor in 
1952 found, with respect to  wage trends for agricultural workers during 
the bracero era, "that wages by States were inversely related to  the supply 
of alien labor."H Citizen farmworkers in the southwest simply could not  
compete with braceros. Braceros were totally subject t o  the unilateral 
demands of employers. For this reason, they were especially appealing 
workers to  employers. There were also numerous charges that employers 
either ignored or  circumvented the provisions for the protection of wage 
rates and working conditions." The bracero program was also a significant 
factor in the rapid exodus of rural Chicanos between 1950 and 1970 to 
urban U.S. labor markets, where they were often poorly prepared to  find 
employment and housing.lo 
The  drive to repeal P.L. 78 was led by the AFL-CIO, various Chicano 
groups, and an array of other community organizations generally con- 
cerned with the welfare of low income workers. Arguing that in south- 
western agriculture, the prevailing wage was in fact set by the braceros 
themselves rather than by domestic labor market factors, the Kennedy 
Administration promised in 1961 that much tighter administrative regu- 
lations would be imposed. Beginning in mid-1962, the Department of 
Labor set an "adverse-effect wage rate" for each state. These were mini- 
mum wage rates that the Department determined had to be paid t o  pre- 
vent braceros from adversely affecting what would otherwise be market- 
determined wages for citizen agricultural workers. In most cases, the 
adverse wage rates were set higher than the prevailing wages. The  adverse 
wage, however, had to be offered to  citizen workers if the agricultural 
employer intended to seek foreign workers. Under these terms, the bracero 
program lost much of its attractiveness to employers. The  bitter political 
struggle over the program came t o  an end with the termination of the pro- 
gram on  December 3 1, 1964. The only supporter of the program at  the 
time was the Department of State, which believed that "the program has 
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hccn herieficinl t~ hicuien" and wnrncrl that even if the program were 
tcrmit1;l:ctl. hte'tican \\.<>I-kcrs \v~>ulcl lilcly continue to come anyhow- 
:llbeit illsgillly." I 'his hame c,>ncltrsion was drawn hy t h ~ .  Mexican gov- 
~ , r n m e ~ l t .  which fc;~rctl th:rt tlie h~-:lcer<>s h:~cl heen exposed to  the wages 
and working conditions of  he Cinitcd St:~tes 2nd wcrc unlikely to be cnn- 
tent \vith thc poorel. upportunitic.5 at h~>rne." In fact. the nccclcration in 
11ic rate o f  ill~.g;~l irninigl..rti~>n frc>rn hlc'tict> can virtually he clnted to  the 
tern1i1ration of the bracero progr:rrn. 
Follcnving the prcec~lcrit set hy the h4exican Labor Prngr;~m, the gov- 
ernments of tlie British \Crest Indies (including J:~ninien. St. Lucia. St. 
Vincent.  Dorni~iic:~. :~ncl R:~rh:~~lc>r) and the Bahamas also entered into 
all intcr~overri1nc1it:11 ;rgrecnrent with the Llnit~'d States in April 1943 to  
create a non-irnmigr:r11t progrilm to >upply ngricultural workers. Known 
as thc British West Indim Prtlgram (BCVI program),  it was designed as a 
response to eollccrns hy employers along tlie East Coast that they too  
wcrc espcr icnc i~~g \vt~rt in~e lahnr shortngcs. As most BWI workers spoke 
English. they hzrd :rn 11~l~:lntage to ernploycrs over the Mexican workers 
:~\~ail:rt,le in thc hrilccro prog3nl .  
Like thc I>r;lcern prc>gr;\ni, the BWI program wits formalized on the 
b;isis c>t P.I.. 1 5  from 1913 thrc>ugli Ic>17. Although the aggregate num- 
her.; ~ c r c  s~ili~ll--ilho~rt 24.000 :I ycar- hen comparetl to the hrtlcero 
prngranr. BW1 \\~clrkcrs were a suhst:rntial part of the particr~lar ngricul- 
tu~-;rl I~rhor rn;11-kcts in \vhicli they were employed.':' Tlis BW1 program, 
howe\~er, tlitl permit scwle cmplnynlent in non-ngriculturi~l work during 
the wLlr ys:~rs." From Ic)17 to  1952. the BWI program was IC-converted 
into n temporary ;rgrieuItur;rl \vorlcr program as allowed under the Im- 
migrntion Act o f  191 7. 
i\ review 01 thc RWI pr(>gra~ii t y :I prehidentiz~l cnnimission in 1952 
cc>ntlemnetl the prc>gr:um':, utiniini>tration. In particular i t  ;~ttackccl the 
Isick vt' "vigil.~r>cc f<,r t l ~ c  ~r<,rcctic>n <>I' living :rnd working st:~ndards" of 
the workers.':' 
P o l i c y  I>rr-rloptrtr ,~/:  Thr P o < /  1952 E\pr , i r~ , r r  
I n  1951, the I~iimigration and Nationality Act recodificcl and revised 
the nation's prcvililing irnmigr~rtion I;lw. In the process. it ~epea led  the 
Alien C'untrz~ct Li~bilr Act of IS85 with its ban on contract labor. All 
persons entering the nation had to  he clnssified as heing either immigrants 
Reproduced w~th  permlsslon of the copyr~ght owner Further reproduct~on proh~b~ted w~thout permlsslon 
Non-Immigrant Labor Policy 615 
or  non-immigrants. But  the concept of ncn-immigrants became infinitely 
more complex. The act specified twelve classes of non-immigrants--each 
divided into subclasses. An unofficial convention has evolved whereby the 
individual classes and subclasses are identified by the letters and numbers 
of the section of the act. Several classes cannot work in the United States 
(for example, visitors for pleasure or  aliens in transit) ; others can work 
in the United States but their work has little o r  no  impact on  the U.S. 
labor market (for example, foreign ambassadors, o r  officials of inter- 
national organizations, o r  representatives of foreign news media) ; others 
d o  work directly in the labor force.'"able 2 indicates the non-immigrant 
Table 2. N ~ ~ r n b e r s  of Non-Immigrants Admitted to the Uni ted  States in Zm- 
migration Categories T h a t  Are Permitted t o  Work, Fiscal Year 1978 
Classificarion Number o f  Workers 
Caregory Group Adrnirred 
Treaty trader or investor E 50.43 1 
Student F- 1 187,030 
Temporary worker of distinguished ability 
or merit H- 1 16,838 
Other temporary worker H-2 22,832 
Industrial trainee H-3 3,309 
Exchange visitor 1-1 53,319 
FiancC (be) of U.S. citizen K- 1 5,730 
Intra-company transfer L- 1 21,495 
Total 360,984 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Justice, Annual Report o f  rhe Irnrnigrarion and Nar- 
urolizariorr Service: 1978 (Washington, D. c.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1979). Tables 16 and 168. 
categories permitted to  work legally and the corresponding number of 
admissions in 1978 for each classification. 
Among the non-immigrants permitted to  work as part of the regular 
labor force arc several classifications free to  change jobs at  will. They are 
not linked contractually to employers. Among these, for instance, are 
foreign students who may legally work (F-1 workers) in any occupation 
if they receive permission from the Immigration and Naturalization Ser- 
vice ( INS) .  Most of the others are under some form of binding contrac- 
tual obligations to their employers. Among these a re  H-1 workers (per- 
sons of distinguished merits and ability-such as opera singers, actors, 
and various professional workers); J-1 workers (exchange visitors in 
various in:ernational programs) ; and L-1 workers (intra-company trans- 
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fcrees of n~ulti-national corporat ions) .  Most of these workers a re  in white- 
coll;rr occtrpatic>ns or  other highly skilled jobs. 
It is t h r  H-2 progranr for "other tetnporary workers," however, that 
has generiitcd most of the controversy. In  1969  69.288 H-2 workers- 
the largest number ever-were admitted. T h e  number has  since declined 
;~n t l  eveletl 011 t i )  a round 23.000 3 year. Tahle 3 indicates the occupa- 
Talrlr 9. Orr-r,pniio~~s of .a11 X o ~ r - l ~ ~ ~ ~ n i g r n ~ r t  N-2 Il'orkers ..Id~nitted lo  th r  
~JII;IPII Sfatr.5 D I I I - ~ I B ~  Fi,wnI l ' r < ~ r  1978 
~ - - ~   .- . .- . -. . 
-- 
-- 
O ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r ~ n r i ~ ~ ~ t  Namhc-r Admirred 
I>rofeision;~l ; nd rrchnicl~l 
Manegsrs zrntl adrninistrntors 
Si~les \rarhers 
C'lrric~l workers 
Cririt norhers 
f>prr ;~t i \ ,e  ( xcept in tri~nsportationl 
Tr;insporlation opcrati\.?s 
Non-farm lahorers 
Fi~rmers and fnrln mnnngsrs 
F- l tn~  laborers end fr>renlcn 
Service \vorhers (except privitte hooseh, 
1'riv;lte hoilsehold \vorhers 
old 
l.SR.5 
0 
8.306 
511 
376 
Total 22.832 
SOIIRCE: L1.S. Department of lustics. dnnr,nl Rrporr of rhr Imt~~iprnrio~r and Nnr- 
rrrolizorinn Servirr-: 1978 (Washington. D.C.; U.S. Govat-nmsnt Printing 
Oflice. 1979). Tnhlr 168.  
tional clistrihution of all FI-2 workers in 1978.  Within the H-2 classifica- 
tion, the largest single occupi~t ion has generally been farm ~ o r k c r s . ' ~  As 
the size of the program has declined. the proportion of the total who  a re  
ngricultural wclrkers has risen t o  more than one-third of all H-2 workers. 
T h e  non-agrict~lturnl H-2 workers a re  occupationally dispersed. T h e  
largest group are professional and  technical workers. generally people 
"of lower stzitus than those entering on H-1 visas" or  exchange  visitor^.'^ 
Most of these a re  writers, artists. and entertainers, followcd hy  athletes 
and musicians. 
Supposedly, H-2 workers can he admitted only ''if unemployed persons 
capable of performing such service or  lahor cannot  he found in this coun- 
try." I t  is u p  t o  the Department of Labor t o  decide whether citizen work- 
ers  a re  available. In  making its determination, the department  applies 
th r  system of "adverse wage rates." T h e  final entry decision. however. 
resides not with the Department of Lahor  hut rather with the Department  
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of Justice. Frequently, the latter overrules the former's decisions against 
admission. 
H-2 workers d o  not pay social security taxes, which means that the 
employer does not deduct the tax from the employee's wage nor does the 
employer have to match the tax, as  is the case with citizen workers. H-2 
workers are also exempt from unemployment compensation taxes on em- 
ployer payrolls. Hence, an employer may secure H-2 workers a t  wage 
costs below those paid to citizen workers even when the nominal rates 
are the same to both. 
Although many non-agricultural H-2 workers enter under contractual 
terms that tie them to  specific employers, their wages and working con- 
ditions a re  not controversial nor a re  they seen a s  any threat to citizen 
workers The same cannot be said for  the agricultural H-2 workers or  for 
the use of the entire H-2 worker program in the territories of G u a m  and 
the Virgin Islands. These cases require brief elaboration. 
Agricultural H-2 Workers 
The H-2 program in agriculture incorporates all of the undesirable 
features of its forerunner, the bracero program. Workers are totally de- 
pendent upon their employers. Eligibility for the program often depends 
upon one's contacts with certain officials of one's home government. It is 
often considered a privilege to be selected. Corruption in the selection 
process is rampant. If chosen, the worker can be assured of the oppor- 
tunity to  return again only if his work and attitude please the U.S. em- 
ployer. This is because the employer may "request by name" a set pro- 
portion (usually 5 0  percent) of this year's H-2 workers to  return the next 
year. In effect, the workers must compete with one another on terms very 
favorable to the employer. If at  any time the worker's demeanor is deemed 
unsatisfactory by his employer, the worker may be deported without an 
appeal. Given this system, "it is little wonder that H-2 aliens are 'hard 
working and diligent.' "lo 
Although several countries are involved a s  sources of agricultural H-2 
workers, about 90 percent of their annual numbers are from the British 
West 1nd .e~  (predominantly Jamaica). Their involvement a s  H-2 workers 
is a continuation of the aforementioned BWI labor program, which was 
assumed into the H-2 program in 1952. Throughout the 1950s, the use 
of BWI workers increased, but the BWI was still small in comparison to  
the co-existing bracero program. Hence the BWI program escaped close 
scrutiny. When the bracero program was phased out  in the early 1960% 
attention turned to  the BWI program. The  programs were so  similar in 
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t r ~ ~ c t u r e  that the silnie arprnerl ts  that led to the ternlination of the hra- 
ccro program seemed logically tn :~pply to the BW1 progr;inl. The  Depart- 
mcllt ot' 1- i~bor .lid issi~' more restrictive regulations in the early 1960s 
ancl again in the late 1070s for all H-2 workers. 
f h c  enrployers crf H-2 agriallturnl wcwkerz have contended that the 
mi~jor  i ~ l t c r n a t i ~ c  tr>H-2 \\.c>rkcrh is illcg:~l immigrant>. Illegal immigrants 
have been involvecl in Eiibt Coast :~gri;ultl~rc hut the incidence is helieved 
to ihe much less than has h c c ~ ~  the case in :~gric~:lture in the Southwest. 
East Coast enlploycrs claim that it was the termination of the hracero 
program i l l  thc Souih\vcst in 1964 th.11 led to  the widespread use of illegal 
imniigr;~nts in that region."" Thcy also contend that it ia diflic-ult to  attract 
citizen workers to  Ihese sci~scln;~l occupations."' 
The series of fifty islancls that comprise the Virgin l s l a ~ ~ d s  havc be- 
Icmgccl to the Unitcc: States sincc their purch;rse from Denmark in 1917. 
At the time. free tr;~\,el to fincl employment was traditional throughout 
the Cari!>henn region. I'his practice continued until 1938 when the U.S. 
government ri3lr.d tlii~t th; pl-cvailing immigration statutes applied to the 
islands. All aliens who resided in thr. is1and.s a s  of 1938 wcrc ruled to be 
legal r e i ~ l e n t  ;~licns. During \VorlJ War 11. there was a need for unskilled 
workers :o huiltl up the defense forces on the island of St. Thomas to 
protect tlic P:~n:rmn Cano!. Workers from ncarhy French and British 
islands were i~llowed tc> work o n  these projects. For reasons of cxpedi- 
encv, they wcrc permitted to  stay when the wiir ended 
The. enzrotrncnt of the H-2 provisions in I952 laid the groundwork for 
r:~tifici~tion o f  the process alrenily hegun. In 1956. a temporary worker 
agreenient was reached hetwc.cn the llnited States and the ncarhy British 
Virgin Isl,~ncls. I n  19.59, the agrecnient was extended to includc the many 
other islands of thc British. Frcnch. ancl Dutch West Indies. These H-2 
workers were supposccl to  bc cniployed only in the agriculturi~l and tourist 
ir~clustries. P,w forn~cr ctf~>rts were made to  see i f  citizen workers were 
availahlc, but. in fact. by the enrly 1960s admission was permitted "for 
any job.""" By :he cricl of the 1900s. "alien lahor constituted roughly half 
of the Virgin lsli~nds Inhor f~lrce."~.'  Before long. problems of housing, 
cclucntion. and social conditions for H-2 workers had become so  "terrible" 
that the FI-2 workers hird become "the higgest single prohlem" on  the 
islancls." It was even feared that i f  the status of these workers changed 
from H-2 to  rmident aliens that the native-horn population could lose 
political control of the islands. 
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By the 1970s. it was obvious to  the Department of Labor that "the non- 
immigrant aliens virtually determined the prevailing wage in many occu- 
pati~ns."~"he department, therefore, issu~:d indefinite labor certificat- 
tions to  these H-2 workers and allowed them t o  change jobs freely. It 
would n o  longer make any effort to  see if citizen workers were available. 
All pretense to the existence of a temporary work program was aban- 
doned. 
The Guam Labor Program 
The island of Guam was ceded to  the United States in 1898 as part of 
the treaty ending the Spanish-American War. Because of its strategic 
location in the mid-Pacific, it has remained a key military installation for 
the United States. The  Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was the 
first immigration statute to apply to  Guam. 
During World War 11, Guam was devastated. When the rebuilding 
process began, many residents sought jobs with the federal government 
because the private economy had been virtually destroyed. Against this 
backdrop, the government introduced a non-immigration labor program. 
Most of these foreign workers were admitted to d o  construction work. In 
May of 1947, workers from the Philippines and other islands were hired 
under short-term contracts.'" In 1952, the status of these contract workers 
came into immediate conflict with the newly enacted H-2 provisions. Not 
only were these workers in a variety of occupations but many had been in 
G u a m  for a number of years. They were not "temporary workers." None- 
theless, accepting the contention of the U.S. Navy that they were needed 
for defense purposes, the INS granted all blanket H-2 status in 1953. 
Criticism mounted that H-2 workers on  Guam were receiving "slave 
wages."27 There were also charges of extensive racketeering among the 
labor recruiters in the Philippines involving wage kickbacks and bribery 
in the selection process. Consequently, the INS announced in 1958 that 
the program for non-defense employers would be phased out. In 1960,  
the INS also decided to  end the H-2 defense worker program. It feared 
that the H-2 arrangement was becoming a permanent part of the Guam 
economy and that few efforts were being made to  train citizen workers 
for the jobs held by H-2 workers. In its place, however, non-immigrant 
workers continued to  be admitted under the separate parole authority 
given to the Attorney General under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
to  admit people temporarily for "emergent reasons" or  reasons deemed to  
be in the "public interest."Zx In response to  requests by defense contrac- 
tors and the military on  the island, non-immigrant workers from the 
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Philippines were again admitted until 1975. The  INS instituted a second 
parole program in I962 for temporary workers to  d o  reconstruction work 
after the island was hit by a ssverc typhoon. This program was terminated 
in May 1970 when the INS decided that the H-2 program was more ap- 
propriate for ccmstruction workcrs than the parole procedures.?" 
The revival of thc H-2 program on  Guam came in response to  employer 
claims of labor shortages as a result of the expanding tourist industry in 
particular and thc islitnd's populatiun growth in general. The government 
of Guam also sought H-3 workers as n means of developing new indus- 
tries-cspeci;~lly in agricullure and fishing. During the 1970s. the long- 
standing problem of many H-2 workers not complying with the terms of 
their ailmission surfaced. In othcr words, H-2 workers were overstaying 
their visas irntl hscoming illegal inimigrnnts."" 
By 1977 a Department of Labor report on labor market conditions on 
Guz~ni described then1 ns hcing "abysmal.":" The  report noted that by 
1076 one-si~tl i  of the island's civilian lahor force was N-2 workers. More- 
over. H-2 \vorkers made up 82 percent of all persons employed in con- 
struction. 4'7 percent of agricultural workers. and 15 percent of workers 
in manufacturing." With reference to the working conditions, the report 
cited numerous ssaniplcs of worker abuse by employers and labor re- 
cruitcrs. It also clctailed the Lahor Department's inability to enforce ex- 
isting labor standards in an environment in which workers were completely 
hcholdcn to their employers. The  H-3 workers. under these circumstances, 
had bcconic preferred \vorkcrs for cmployers. Citizen workers could not 
conipetc with them on their terms, leading to a higher rate of unemploy- 
Ilicnt for citizens. .As thc report noted. "alien workers constitute such a 
large proportion of the work force that the wages at  which they are certi- 
fied are the prevailing wage rntc~.",~:' It noted that the wages and working 
conditions wcrc being set not hy a free market but rather as a result of 
government policy. 
A N e w  Role For N o ~ ~ - l n l r , ~ i ~ q r n n t  1S'orker.v 
Beginning in the 1970s and continuing into the early 1980s. policy 
makers have su~:gested an entirely new role for the nation's non-immigrant 
labor policy. As illegal immigration became a national issue, students of 
the issue suggested that a non-immigrant program be included among the 
policy options to overcome this problem. Some advocated creation of a 
new non-immigrant labor program; others argued for expilnsion of the 
existing H-2 program in an effort to absorb and to  legalize the work done 
by many illegal  immigrant^.^^ 
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Implicit in all o f  the proposals was the assumption that most illegal 
immigrants d o  work shunned by citizen workers. It was argued that the 
non-immigrant workers would not affect the wages and working condi- 
tions of citizen workers since they would-by virtual definition-not com- 
pete for  the same jobs. None of these proposals contained any historical 
review of the nation's past experiences with non-immigrant programs. As 
a result, they a re  all merely conceptual programmatic sketches. None 
scratched the surface of such critical issues as how the workers are to be 
recruited; what their job entitlements are; what the limitations to be 
placed on employer prerogatives to limit exploitation are; what the means 
used to  test for job certification are to  be; and what protections assuring 
that prevailing standards for citizen workers and for unions will not be 
undermined are to  be included. 
In August 1977, the Carter administration included within its immigra- 
tion reform package an explicit charge that the H-2 program be given a 
comprehensive r e v i e ~ . ~ U A l t h o u g h  explicitly denying any interest in a 
bracero program, the administration implied that a n  expanded temporary 
work program might meet the needs of some employers while not ad- 
versely affecting citizen workers. After studying the proposal, the 
Commission for Manpower Policy advised President Carter that it was 
"strongly against" any expanded H-2 program."" 
Rather than act directly upon the Carter administration's immigration 
proposals, Congress established the Select Commission on Immigration 
and Refugee Policy to  study all dimensions of the nation's immigration 
policy. In its subsequent report, the commission acknowledged that the 
H-2 program has been the source of significant criticism. Nevertheless, 
the Select Commission concluded that "a continuation of the program is 
necessary and preferable to the institution of a new one.":i' It made sev- 
eral suggestions to "streamline" the administration of the program. I t  
recommended that employers be required to pay both social security and 
unemployment compensation payroll taxes on  all H-2 workers in order 
to remove "inducements to hire H-2 workers over U.S. workers."3R The 
commission specifically concluded that there should not be any new tem- 
porary worker program established a s  part of any strategy to combat 
illegal i m m i g r a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
By the time the Select Commission issued its report in 1981, the Reagan 
Administration had taken office. That  administration formed a task force 
chaired by the Attorney General to study the commission's recommenda- 
tions. When the task force released its resporlse in July 1981, it made no 
mention of the H-2 program but did propose that a new "experimental 
temporary worker program for Mexican nationals" be established." The 
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"pilot program" \ ~ o ~ ~ l d  he for a two-year trial period and would be limited 
to 50,000 workers each year. If the concept proved workable it could be 
expanded to il million or so  foreign workers in subsequent years." 
In response to the Select Conlniission's Report and the Reagan Admin- 
istration's proposals. Congress held extensive hearings in the fall of 1982 
(>I? all faccts of the n:ition's immigration policy. A result was a bipar- 
tisan hill called the Ininiigrntion Rcforni and Control Act of 1 9 8 1  ( the 
Simpson-klorzoli hill) .'Vc overwhelmingly passed the Senate in August 
1982 but died on the Rocir of the L1.S. Flouse of Representatives during the 
waning hours of the 97th Cangress. Differences over the role of the H-2 
program was one of the major reasons that this importilnt hill was not 
cna~ted:~:~ It proposed thar the Department of Agriculture become in- 
volvecl in the administration of the tf-2 program for farm workers. It also 
proposed that the Department of Lnhor he required to expedite requests 
by employers for tl-2 workers in any industry. As there is n o  ceiling on 
the number nf H-2. workers that can he admitted, opponents to  the H-2 
program feared that these rlntl other changes would lead to a "backdcor 
hracerc> program" crf upwards of 500.000 non-immigrant workers. 
:1i1 ,Isse.is~~re,~t o j  the ''iVen~" Role for 
S u ~ a - l ~ ~ i i i i i ~ ~ - n i ~ r  Lnhor P r o g m ~ i i s  
As shoulcl he apparent from this review of the evolution of non-immi- 
grant labor policy. iising it as  a means of combatting illegal immigration 
(a  labor supply prohiem) would he a departure from its historic role (as  
a labor demand policy). Contemporary interest in non-immigrant worker 
programs is not based on the existence of a demonstrated need for such 
workers. The proposals for ncw or expanded non-immigrant labor pro- 
grams are designed to supply more workers for unskilled and semi-skilled 
o ~ c u p ~ l t i o n s  in primarily low-wage industries. These are precisely the 
same labor markets in which those subgroups of the labor force with the 
highest uneniployment rates in the nation a re  already found in dispropor- 
tion. N o  one is suggesting that there he a foreign worker program to  sup- 
ply more workers for white-collar occupations. Not or~ ly  would such 
proposals lead to charges of a "brain drain" from source nations, but also 
the opposition of the privileged and protected workers in domestic labor 
markets could he counted upon to kill any such idea at the moment of its 
conception. 
Supporters of n new or  expanded non-immigrant wcrker program for 
the United States often assert that citizen workers will not d o  the types of 
low-wage jobs that non-immigrants and illegal immigrrints perform." 
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Hence, they conclude that there will be n o  adverse effects on the domestic 
larbor force. Except for scattered anecdotes, no  empirical evidence has 
been collected to support this view. I n  fact, there is ample evidence that 
illegal immigrants d o  compete directly for jobs in occupations that also 
attract millions of citizen workers.'" N o  one can seriously argue that citi- 
zens are unavailable for certain types of jobs when each day the majority 
of  persons who work in these occupations are citizen workers. The U.S.  
Department of  Labor estimated that in 1981 there were 29 million work- 
ers (or  3 0  percent of the employed labor force) employed in "the kinds 
of low-skilled industrial, service, and agricultural jobs in which illegal 
aliens typically seek e m p l ~ y m e n t . " ~ ~  I t  also estimated that 10.5 million 
workers were employed in jobs that paid the federal minimum wage 
($3.35 an hour) and that an additional 10 million workers were receiv- 
ing only 3 0  to 40 cents per hour more than the minimum wage. For  the 
contentions of the advocates of new o r  expanded non-immigrant worker 
programs to be valid, they must be willing to argue that there will be too 
few citizen workers available no  matter what the wages or  benefits asso- 
ciated with certain occupations in the American economy. 
The  presence of non-immigrant workers affects not only job oppor- 
tunities but also wage levels in any given labor market. It is these wage 
effects that are part of the attractiveness of both non-immigrant workers 
and illegal immigrants to American employers. Employers are able to 
obtain workers in selected labor markets at  less cost than would be  the 
case in t h e i ~  absence. It is also probable that foreign workers in low- 
wage American industries a re  less likely to  make demands for job rights 
or to  join unions. 
Another flaw in thesc proposals is their intended magnitude. An ex- 
panded non-immrgrant program cannot d o  anything to reduce illegal 
immigration unless the program is significantly large (a t  least in the 
500,000- to 750,000-person range each ycar) .  But the larger the pro- 
gram, the greater the likelihood of adverse impact on  citizen workers in 
selected labor markets. O n  the other hand, if the scale of the program is 
small, where will the deterrence to illegal entry be? Politically, if not eco- 
nomically, speaking, there must be some limitations on the size of the 
program. If there is, what will s top others who are  not selected from com- 
ing, o r  others, whose period of work has expired but who wish to remain, 
from staying? A new or  expanded non-immigrant labor program does not 
resolve any of the prevailing problems with the nation's immigration 
policies while it adds a host of new ones. 
Moreover, most of the advocates of new non-immigrant programs as- 
sume either implicitly-or explicitly in the case of the Reagan plan-that 
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the program would be a bilateral arrangement with Mexico. But illegal 
immigrants arc strcnming into the United States from many countries 
other than Mexico. If the prclgr;lni were restricted to Mexicans, it would 
d o  nothing to reduce the flc~\\a from these other nations that, collectively, 
account for ahout one-half of all illegal immigration. 
One specific study has sought to examine the alleged need for foreign 
workers from the viewpoint t>f .American employers." Conducted in San 
Diego, California. in 198 1 .  it sought to discover if employers could pay 
the highcr, competirive wages necde~l to attract citizcn workers to certain 
industries in which illegal immigrants were wiclely used. Enlployers in 
;tgriculture. restaurants. and elcctmnic manufacturing in Srtn Diego were 
intcrvicwed. Consistently. the employers lauded illegal immigrant workcrs 
ovci  citizen workcrs. But rather than rely simply on the attitudes of em- 
ployers. the study also investig:~ted whether employers would he forced 
tn go out of business or, in some s:rses, to reloc;ltc south of the horder if 
they had to conlpete actively for citizen workcrs. Employers were not 
asked if they \\'ere willing to pay n prevailing wage, but rather. "at what 
would you go out of business i f  you had to raise wages in order to 
attr;rct U.S. \vorlers?" The study found that the ceiling wage indicated by 
employers \\.as sutliciently high to attract citizen workers hut that the em- 
ploycrs preferred the more profitable low wages that they could offer to  
foreign workers. .4s ;I result. the study concluded that labor displacement 
\\-as occurring in the San Diego lahor market.4s Hence. the study con- 
cluded that "a foreign-worker program would simply legitimize this strat- 
~ g y . " ~ "  
The past experience of the nation with non-immigrant lahor programs 
in low-wage industries has revealed another pernicious long-run effect of 
their operations. Namely, when workers come from economically less 
devclopcd countries to  the United States, they are made aware of oppor- 
tunities that for many are beyond their previous imagination. The  rela- 
tively higher wages and the broader array of job opportunities will cause 
many to find ways to remain. Rather than being an alternative to illegal 
immigration. these policies can-as history has repeatedly shown--be- 
come a method that fosters the phenomenon. 
It should not he surprising that among the strongest voices in opposi- 
tion to  proposals to  expand temporary worker programs have been those 
from groups closely associated with the protection of opportunities for 
low-wage workcrs. For example, a 1979 conference on  "Jobs for His- 
panics"-sponsored by the Lahor Council for Latin American Advance- 
ment and attended by both Hispanic trade unionists and Hispanic com- 
munity groups from across ttle country-took a strong and unanimous 
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stand against a foreign worker program. In their conferenco manifesto, 
called the "Declaration of Albuquerque," they emphatically 5tatcd: "The 
federal government should nor includt any type of 'Bracero' program or 
foreign labor importation as a solution to the current problem of undocu- 
mented Similar strong statements of opposition to any type of 
new or expanded temporary foreign worker program were made to the 
Select Commission by the National Hispanic Task Force (a  group repre- 
scnting eight of the nation's largest Hispanic organizations), and by such 
groups as California Rural Legal Assistance, Texas Rural Legal Aid, 
Inc., and the National Center for Immigrants' Rights."' All of these or- 
ganizations have a long history of dedicated support for the low-income 
workers who would bear the brunt of the competition for jobs from for- 
eign temporary workers. 
When the Reagan administration announced in 1981 its support for a 
new foreign worker program, it was met by a chorus of opposition. The 
administration may have anticipated that the AFL-CIO would attack the 
proposal as being a mechanism for employers t o  find "a docile and con- 
trollable work force."" It was totally unexpected, however, that the 
Mexican labor movement, the Confederacion de  Trabajadores de  Mexico 
(CTM),  would also strongly condemn the idea. In a "Manifesto to the 
People," the president of CTM, Fidcl Velasq~ucz, said that the Reagan 
proposal would convert Mcxican workers into "the biggest strategic labor 
reserve in contemporary history, subject to super-exploitation and servi- 
tudc."""he fact that CTM is an integral part of the Party of Revolution- 
ary Institutions (PRI) ,  which has solely controlled Mexican political af- 
fairs since a few years after the Mexican revolution in 1917, meant im- 
plicitly that it was speaking for the Mexican government. Officially, the 
Mexican government did not comment on the Reagan proposal but it is 
inconceivable that CTM would speak out publicly in opposition to  the 
plan if it did not represent the consensus view of PRI. 
Likewise, one of the strongest critics of the proposed H-2 changes 
embodied in the aforementioned Simpson-Mazzoli bill was the Mexican 
American Legal Defense and Education Fund. Its president charged in 
October 1982 that "the Simpson-Mazzoli H-2 program is really just a 
replay of the bracero program" and that its provisions would actually 
"foster" illegal immigration just as  the old program did.64 
Concluding Observations 
There are features of the nation's non-immigrant labor policies that are 
both logical and beneficial to the economy and the quality of life of the 
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nation. Yet within the broad ~linlensions of non-immigrant labor policy 
there has also been .I progrenimetic history that is not so  easy t o  rational- 
ize. It has usu;~lly involved tlie eniploymcnt of workers less skilled and 
less talented than thaw gsnsrally a\,ail:~hle within the American labor 
force hut who are, ncx:ethelesa. simil.rr in their employnient capabilities 
to csrtnin 1:ri-g~ segments of the American labor force. These instances 
ch;~llenpe thr. snnguinc ;ittitude surrounding non-in1migr:rnt lahor policy. 
f:or ; I  the histcrry of these en~lsnvivs reve.11~. there has hsen ;I persistent 
theme of misuse n n ~ l  ;~bu\c.. Rec.,tuns these non-immigr;~nt workcrs are 
unskilletl irnd frcrni r r la t i~e ly  i m p ~ v e r i s h ~ d  backgrounds, they are easy 
prey for a corrupt sslectinn process in their hums nations over which the 
LTnitecl States has little control. Once in the United States. these workcrs 
a!-e often subject to working cnnclitic>ns that they may perccive to he de- 
sirable (relative ttr thc nlternative.; in thcir homelands) hut which affect 
the attri~clivenss\ oC the jirbs t i ,  citixsn workers. T o  the dcgrcc that the 
prcvailing working stitnclz~rds begin ti, deteriorate as cmplnycrs hire non- 
inirnigrant \\'orkers. c i t i ~ e n  \vor.ker zravitate elsewhere and become less 
;rv;~il;lble. En1ploye1-s scicin nc>t irnl) heconie dependent on non-immigrant 
workers but ;~ l so  come to prefer them. 
c i s  a preclict;~b!e ccrnsequcnce, non-immigrant programs for less 
skilled z~ncl lehs tzilentecl worker.; are consistently implemented under the 
guise of temporary worker prirgrams. But, as past experience in the United 
States and in Europe has tlsnionstrnted. these programs for low-wage 
workers hecome long-term slnlrces of lahor supply.5s They become an 
institutionolircd phentmienz~ tli;~t exerts a narcotic influence on  all parties 
invol\~etl in tlie cniploynient process. Employers. foreign workers, and the 
g ~ \ , e r n ~ i l e n t \  of S ~ U I - C C  ~ i > ~ l n t r i e s  become atldicted. The  rationale for their 
cxistc'ncc I>cct>me\ Icrst in the rsaroning proci-ss that justifies thcir con- 
tinuation over tims. Originally. non-imniiyri~nt programs were created 
nnly cluring \v;lr srnergency periods. hut they traditionally continued long 
after tlie \v:\rs were over. With the advent of thc H-2 progrnm, they have 
bccomc n feature of peacetime, too, and there have been persistent pro- 
po\als to expand their sire and asope. 
Non-imn~igrant worker programs in low-wags industries have been of 
irltcrct to cmplcryers primarily :IS a n1e:lns of reducing their costs of pro- 
iluction and enh;~~icing their c c ~ ~ t r o l  aver their workcrs. Non-in~migrant 
low-wage workers arc attractive largely hr.cause of their dependence upon 
their employers. citi<en workers who compete with these non- immi~mnt  
workers fincl that their existing w<>rking conditions usually either become 
frozen or  dccli~ie. Under few circumstances will they improve. Efforts to  
cstz~blish unions ;Ire ni ,~dc more clificnlt. Moreover. it is likely that if em- 
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ployers were forced t o  rely on  citizen workers they would pay more atten- 
tion to worker productivity issues such as enhanced supervision, provision 
of job training, and redesign of jobs. These have been some of the reac- 
tions by European employers to  a reduction in the number of foreign 
workers available to them since 1974. 
Thus, non-immigrant labor policy can be seen to  be a topic that has 
played a long and often controversial role in American immigration 
policy. It is likely that it will continue to d o  so. I t  is to  be hoped, however, 
that usage of non-immigrant workers will be limited and constantly mon- 
itored. Certainly there is nothing in the programmatic history of such 
endeavors that would warrant their expansion under the pretext of being 
a cure for  illegal immigration. 
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